On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis' second critique
Sophia 45 (2) (2006)
|Abstract||In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thinking that our being weakly benevolent, morally bivalent, or weakly malevolent by nature is sufficient to refute my critique of the traditional freewill theodicy. I still maintain that the argument from freedom of the will offers an explanation of moral evil that is, in the final analysis, manifestly inadequate.|
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