On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis' second critique
Sophia 45 (2) (2006)
| Abstract | In this essay, I answer Nick Trakakis’ second critique of my argument against the adequacy of traditional free will theodicy. I argue, first, that Trakakis errs in his implicit assertion that my argument relies upon our being strongly malevolent by nature. I argue, second, that Trakakis errs in thinking that our being weakly benevolent, morally bivalent, or weakly malevolent by nature is sufficient to refute my critique of the traditional freewill theodicy. I still maintain that the argument from freedom of the will offers an explanation of moral evil that is, in the final analysis, manifestly inadequate. | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesKirk Durston (2006). The Complexity of History and Evil: A Reply to Trakakis. Religious Studies 42 (1):87-99.
Nick Trakakis (2004). Second Thoughts on the Alleged Failure of Free Will Theodicies. Sophia 43 (2).
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