On the alleged connection between moral evil and human freedom: A response to Trakakis' third critique
Sophia 47 (2) (2008)
| Abstract | In this essay, I respond to Nick Trakakis’ “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” This critique is directed against my argument concerning the inadequacy of the traditional theistic argument from free will. I contend that the argument from free will does not adequately explain the distribution of moral evil in the world. I maintain that the third critique, like Trakakis’ earlier critiques, is unconvincing. I remain convinced that my original argument regarding the inadequacy of the traditional argument from free will is compelling. The argument from freedom of the will, considered in itself, is unpersuasive. | |||||||||
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Nick Trakakis (2003). Evil and the Complexity of History: A Response to Durston. Religious Studies 39 (4):451-458.
Kirk Durston (2006). The Complexity of History and Evil: A Reply to Trakakis. Religious Studies 42 (1):87-99.
Peter Coghlan & Nick Trakakis (2006). Confronting the Horror of Natural Evil: An Exchange Between Peter Coghlan and Nick Trakakis. Sophia 45 (2).
Nick Trakakis (2004). Second Thoughts on the Alleged Failure of Free Will Theodicies. Sophia 43 (2).
Nick Trakakis (2006). A Third (Meta-)Critique. Sophia 45 (2).
Joel Thomas Tierno (2006). On the Alleged Connection Between Moral Evil and Human Freedom: A Response to Trakakis' Second Critique. Sophia 45 (2).
Nick Trakakis (2003). On the Alleged Failure of Free Will Theodicies: A Reply to Tierno. Sophia 42 (2).
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