Warranted neo-confucian belief: Religious pluralism and the affections in the epistemologies of Wang yangming (1472–1529) and Alvin Plantinga [Book Review]
Graduate studies at Western
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (1):31-55 (2004)
|Abstract||In this article, I argue that Wang Yangming'sNeo-Confucian religious beliefs can bewarranted, and that the rationality of hisreligious beliefs constitutes a significantdefeater for the rationality of Christianbelief on Alvin Plantinga's theory of warrant. I also question whether the notion of warrantas proper function can adequately account fortheories of religious knowledge in which theaffections play an integral role. Idemonstrate how a consideration of Wang'sepistemology reveals a difficulty forPlantinga's defense of the rationality ofChristian belief and highlights a limitation ofPlantinga's current conception of warrant asproper function.|
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