David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (4):549-66 (2006)
Many arguments have been advanced for the view that "Why be moral?" is a pseudo-question. In this paper I address one of the most widely known and influential of them, one that comes from John Hospers and J. C. Thornton. I do so partly because, strangely, an important phase of that argument has escaped close attention. It warrants such attention because, firstly, not only is it important to the argument in which it appears, it is important in wider respects. For instance, if it is sound it has weighty consequences even if the argument in which it figures fails. Secondly, it is not sound; it succumbs to a simple objection.
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Singer (1993). Practical Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
David P. Gauthier (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press.
Plato & C. D. C. Reeve (2004). Republic. Hackett Publishing.
Michael A. Slote (2001). Morals From Motives. Oxford University Press.
Mark Carl Overvold (1984). Morality, Self-Interest, and Reasons for Being Moral. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (4):493-507.
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