David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 161 (2):309 - 323 (2008)
In this paper, I challenge a familiar argument -- a composite of arguments in the literature -- for the view that “Why be moral?” is a pseudo-question. I do so by refuting a component of that argument, a component that is not only crucial to the argument but important in its own right. That component concerns the status of moral reasons in replies to “Why be moral?”; consequently, this paper concerns reasons and rationality no less than it concerns morality. The work I devote to those topics shows not only that the argument I address is unsound, but that the conclusion of that argument is false. “Why be moral?” is no pseudo-question.
|Keywords||Rationality Practical reasons Moral reasons Reasons for action Pseudo-questions “Why be moral?”|
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References found in this work BETA
Russ Shafer-Landau (2003). Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press.
Michael Smith (1994). The Moral Problem. Blackwell.
Thomas Scanlon (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
David P. Gauthier (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Bruno Guindon (2016). Sources, Reasons, and Requirements. Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1253-1268.
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