Demotivating Semicompatibilism

Ideas Y Valores 141:5-20 (2009)
In this paper, I explore some of the motivations behind John Martin Fischer�s semi-compatibilism. Particularly, I look at three reasons Fischer gives for preferring semi-compatibilism to libertarianism. I argue that the first two of these motivations are in tension with each other: the more one is moved by the first motivation, the less one can appeal to the second, and vice versa. I then argue that Fischer�s third motivation ought not move anyone to prefer Fischer�s semi-compatibilist picture to any of the leading contemporary libertarian theories. Finally, I make some methodological comments about the role intuitions play in Fischer�s project.
Keywords free will  moral responsibility  semi-compatibilism  John Martin Fischer
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Gary Watson (1998). Some Worries About Semi-Compatibilism. Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2):135-143.
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