Free Will: Sourcehood and its Alternatives

Continuum International Pub. Group (2012)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords Free will and determinism
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Call number BJ1460.T56 2012
ISBN(s) 9781441189936
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Citations of this work BETA
Manuel Vargas (2012). Why the Luck Problem Isn't. Philosophical Issues 22 (1):419-436.
Tina Talsma (2013). Source Incompatibilism and the Foreknowledge Dilemma. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.
Similar books and articles
Kadri Vihvelin, Arguments for Incompatibilism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Tamler Sommers (2007). The Illusion of Freedom Evolves. In Don Ross, David Spurrett, Harold Kincaid & G. Lynn Stephens (eds.), Distributed Cognition and the Will: Individual volition and social context. MIT Press. 61.
Timothy O'Connor, Free Will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Noa Latham (2004). Determinism, Randomness, and Value. Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):153-167.
Peter van Inwagen (2000). Free Will Remains a Mystery. Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
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