Faith and Philosophy 24 (3):284-299 (2007)
|Abstract||Eleonore Stump has recently articulated an account of grace which is neither deterministic nor Pelagian. Drawing on resources from Aquinas’s moral psychology, Stump’s account of grace affords the quiescence of the will a significant role in an individual’s coming to saving faith. In the present paper, I firstoutline Stump’s account and then raise a worry for that account. I conclude by suggesting a metaphysic that provides a way of resolving this worry. The resulting view allows one to maintain both (i) that divine grace is the efficient cause of saving faith and (ii) that humans control whether or not they come to saving faith|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Joseph A. DiNoia (1992). Nature, Grace, and Experience. Philosophy and Theology 7 (2):115-126.
Phillip L. Quinn (1990). Saving Faith From Kant's Remarkable Antimony. Faith and Philosophy 7 (4):418-433.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2003). Why Christians Should Not Be Libertarians: An Augustinian Challenge. Faith and Philosophy 20 (4):460-478.
Paul Helm (1994). Calvin and Bernard on Freedom and Necessity: A Reply to Brümmer. Religious Studies 30 (4):457 - 465.
Matthew Alan Gaumer (2010). The Development of the Concept of Grace in Late Antique North Africa. Augustinianum 50 (1):163-187.
Jacqueline Mariña (1997). Kant on Grace: A Reply to His Critics. Religious Studies 33 (4):379-400.
Eleonore Stump (2007). Justifying Faith : Grace and Free Will. In Richard L. Velkley (ed.), Freedom and the Human Person. Catholic University of America Press.
James B. Gould (2008). The Grace We Are Owed. Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):261-275.
Kevin Timpe (2007). Grace and Controlling What We Do Not Cause. Faith and Philosophy 24 (3):284-299.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads7 ( #133,479 of 549,071 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,317 of 549,071 )
How can I increase my downloads?