The dialectic role of the flickers of freedom

Philosophical Studies 131 (2):337 - 368 (2006)
One well-known incompatibilist response to Frankfurt-style counterexamples is the ‘flicker-of-freedom strategy’. The flicker strategy claims that even in a Frankfurt-style counterexample, there are still morally relevant alternative possibilities. In the present paper, I differentiate between two distinct understandings of the flicker strategy, as the failure to differentiate these two versions has led some philosophers to argue at cross-purposes. I also explore the respective dialectic roles that the two versions of the flicker strategy play in the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Building on this discussion, I then suggest a reason why the compatibilism/incompatibilism debate has reached a stalemate.
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    Tina Talsma (2013). Source Incompatibilism and the Foreknowledge Dilemma. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 73 (3):209-219.
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