Will cognitive science change ethics?: Review essay of Larry may, Marilyn Friedman & Andy Clark (eds) mind and morals: Essays on ethics and cognitive science
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 10 (4):531 – 540 (1997)
This paper contains an overview of the essays contained in the Mind and morals anthology plus a critical discussion of certain themes raised in many of these essays concerning the bearing of recent work in cognitive science on the traditional project of moral theory. Specifically, I argue for the following claims: (1) authors like Virginia Held, who appear to be antagonistic toward the methodological naturalism of Owen Flanagan, Andy Clark, Paul Churchland, and others, are really in fundamental agreement with the naturalists (at least once the naturalist view is suitably clarified); (2) the prototype theory of moral concepts that is inspired by recent work in cognitive science does not necessarily jeopardize the aim of systematization characteristic of traditional moral theory; (3) nor does it threaten certain widely accepted views about moral rationality that is part of traditional moral theorizing. Moreover, I speculate that (4) recent work in cognitive science can be expected to play a corroborative role in the justification of theories in ethics, but we should probably not expect this work to yield new insights and directions in ethics. Finally, (5) Fodor's recent critique of cognitive science makes clear the perils of methodological ethical naturalism.
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References found in this work BETA
W. D. Ross (2002). The Right and the Good. Clarendon Press.
W. V. Quine (1969). Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. Columbia University Press.
Jonathan Dancy (1993). Moral Reasons. Blackwell.
Owen J. Flanagan (1991). Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism. Harvard University Press.
Mark Timmons (1999). Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism. Oxford University Press.
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