Is consciousness necessary to high-level control systems?

[Journal (on-Line/Unpaginated)] (1994)
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Abstract

Building on Bringsjord's (1992, 1994) and Searle's (1992) work, I take it for granted that computational systems cannot be conscious. In order to discuss the possibility that they might be able to pass refined versions of the Turing Test, I consider three possible relationships between consciousness and control systems in human-level adaptive agents.

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References found in this work

Unified theories of cognition.Allen Newell - 1990 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Computing machinery and intelligence.Alan M. Turing - 1950 - Mind 59 (October):433-60.
The Rediscovery of the Mind.John Searle - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1):201-207.

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