Graduate studies at Western
Journal of Philosophical Research 18:277-283 (1993)
|Abstract||Beliefs about fair prices for betting arrangements can obviously vary depending upon how the contingencies are described, even though each of the different descriptions is correct. This sort of variation in beliefs on the part of an agent has been Iinked by Ramsey and Skyrms with the agent’s susceptibility to a dutch book situation involving some combination of bets on which there is a mathematically-guaranteed net loss as the overall outcome. Clarifying the nature of that Iinkage is the purpose of this paper. After a framework for analysis has been developed, it is shown precisely how several important conditions for having correct beliefs are interrelated|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Robert Titiev (1997). Arbitrage and the Dutch Book Theorem. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:477-482.
Natasha Alechina & Brian Logan (2010). Belief Ascription Under Bounded Resources. Synthese 173 (2):179 - 197.
David J. Owens (2003). Does Belief Have an Aim? Philosophical Studies 115 (3):283-305.
Wei Xiong (2011). Implications of the Dutch Book: Following Ramsey's Axioms. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (2):334-344.
Sven Ove Hansson & Renata Wassermann (2002). Local Change. Studia Logica 70 (1):49 - 76.
Brian Hill (2008). Towards a “Sophisticated” Model of Belief Dynamics. Part I: The General Framework. Studia Logica 89 (1):81 - 109.
Chris Eberle (1997). God's Nature and the Rationality of Religious Belief. Faith and Philosophy 14 (2):152-169.
Brad Armendt (1980). Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics? Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.
T. Seidenfeld, M. J. Schervish & J. B. Kadane (1990). When Fair Betting Odds Are Not Degrees of Belief. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:517 - 524.
Marcelo Alejandro Falappa, Alejandro Javier García, Gabriele Kern-Isberner & Guillermo Ricardo Simari (2013). Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (1):161-193.
Hans van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2):191-209.
Hans Van Ditmarsch & Willem Labuschagne (2007). My Beliefs About Your Beliefs: A Case Study in Theory of Mind and Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155 (2):191 - 209.
Mark Jago (2006). Resource-Bounded Belief Revision and Contraction. In P. Torroni, U. Endriss, M. Baldoni & A. Omicini (eds.), Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies III. Springer.
Niranjan Narasimhan, Kumar Bhaskar & Srinivas Prakhya (2010). Existential Beliefs and Values. Journal of Business Ethics 96 (3):369 - 382.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2011-12-02
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?