David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638 (2013)
Recently psychologists and experimental philosophers have reported findings showing that in some cases ordinary people's moral intuitions are affected by factors of dubious relevance to the truth of the content of the intuition. Some defend the use of intuition as evidence in ethics by arguing that philosophers are the experts in this area, and philosophers' moral intuitions are both different from those of ordinary people and more reliable. We conducted two experiments indicating that philosophers and non-philosophers do indeed sometimes have different moral intuitions, but challenging the notion that philosophers have better or more reliable intuitions.
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Citations of this work BETA
Regina A. Rini (2014). Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.
Wesley Buckwalter (2012). Surveying Philosophers: A Response to Kuntz & Kuntz. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):515-524.
Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely (2013). Predicting Philosophical Disagreement. Philosophy Compass 8 (10):978-989.
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