David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):497-520 (2009)
visual masking provides a clear illustration that ‘there is really only a verbal difference’ between two versions of the Cartesian Theater model of the mind. This alleged lack of a distinction is both the crucial premise of their main argument against the Cartesian Theater and a motivator for accepting their own Multiple Drafts model. I argue that metacontrast reveals a difference between the two versions of the Cartesian Theater that meets criteria found in (Dennett and Kinsbourne ) for determining such a difference. This difference undermines the soundness of their argument against the Cartesian Theater, and exerts pressure on Dennett and Kinsbourne to offer a more detailed articulation of their model. Introduction Brief Explanation of Metacontrast Backward Visual Masking The Stalinesque and Orwellian Models of Metacontrast 3.1 Criteria for determining a difference A Difference That Makes a Difference 4.1 Skeptical hypothesis objection Other Objections and Replies 5.1 Straw person objection 5.2 Corroborative issues objection Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?
|Keywords||Dennett masking metacontrast consciousness Stalinesque / Orwellian Cartesian Theater|
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1995). On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Haluk Ogmen & Jian Chen (2004). Unconscious Priming by Color and Form: Different Processes and Levels. Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):138-157.
Bruno G. Breitmeyer, Tony Ro & Neel S. Singhal (2004). Unconscious Color Priming Occurs at Stimulus- Not Percept-Dependent Levels of Processing. Psychological Science 15 (3):198-202.
Daniel Dennett (1993). Caveat Emptor (Reply to Essays on Consciousness Explained - Reply to Mangan, Toribio, Baars and Mcgovern) In. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (1):48-57.
Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Caveat Emptor. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (12-13):48-57.
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