David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 152 (1):127-133 (2011)
There are several argumentative strategies for advancing the thesis that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism. One prominent such strategy is to argue that agents who meet compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility can nevertheless be subject to responsibility-undermining manipulation. In this paper, I argue that incompatibilists advancing manipulation arguments against compatibilism have been shouldering an unnecessarily heavy dialectical burden. Traditional manipulation arguments present cases in which manipulated agents meet all compatibilist conditions for moral responsibility, but are (allegedly) not responsible for their behavior. I argue, however, that incompatibilists can make do with the more modest (and harder to resist) claim that the manipulation in question is mitigating with respect to moral responsibility. The focus solely on whether a manipulated agent is or is not morally responsible has, I believe, masked the full force of manipulation-style arguments against compatibilism. Here, I aim to unveil their real power.
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References found in this work BETA
Alfred R. Mele (2006). Free Will and Luck. Oxford University Press.
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Free Will and Luck. Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.
Alfred R. Mele (2005). A Critique of Pereboom's 'Four-Case Argument' for Incompatibilism. Analysis 65 (285):75-80.
Citations of this work BETA
Eric Christian Barnes (2015). Freedom, Creativity, and Manipulation. Noûs 49 (3):560-588.
Patrick Todd (2013). Defending (a Modified Version of) the Zygote Argument. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):189-203.
Michael McKenna (2014). Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard‐Liner Takes It on the Chin. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):467-484.
Andrew C. Khoury (2014). Manipulation and Mitigation. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):283-294.
Hannah Tierney (2013). A Maneuver Around the Modified Manipulation Argument. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):753-763.
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