Counterfactual conditionals and the presuppositions of induction

Philosophy of Science 31 (2):101-110 (1964)
In this paper I will argue that Professor Goodman was correct in thinking that there is a problem concerning counterfactual conditionals, but that it is somewhat different from the problem he thought it to be, and is one that is even more basic. I will also try to show that this problem is distinct from Hume's "problem" of induction, and that additional assumptions have to be made for counterfactual induction beyond those required for other kinds of induction
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DOI 10.1086/287987
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