David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Review 120 (1):97 - 115 (2011)
In his recent essay in the Philosophical Review, “Truth and Freedom,” Trenton Merricks contends (among other things) that the basic argument for the incompatibility of God's foreknowledge and human freedom is question-begging. He relies on a “truism” to the effect that truth depends on the world and not the other way around. The present essay argues that mere invocation of this truism does not establish that the basic argument for incompatibilism is question-begging. Further, it seeks to clarify important elements of the debate, including the fixity-of-the-past premise in the incompatibilist's argument and the Ockhamist response. It sketches some potential links between the issues here and recent work on ontological dependence, and it connects the issues raised by Merricks to important work that has appeared in (among other places) the Philosophical Review
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Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Todd (2013). Soft Facts and Ontological Dependence. Philosophical Studies 164 (3):829-844.
John Fischer (2011). Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past. Philosophia 39 (3):461-474.
John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft (2013). Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question? Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2013). Consequentialism and the World in Time. Ratio 26 (2):212-224.
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