Free Will and Miracles

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):236-238 (2016)
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Abstract

The Consequence Argument is sound only if no one has a choice about the laws of nature, and one prominent compatibilist reply to the argument—championed by David Lewis —begins by claiming that there is a sense in which we do have such a choice, and a sense in which we don't. Lewis then insists that the sense in which we do have such a choice is the only sense required by compatibilism. Peter van Inwagen has responded that even if Lewis's distinction between two senses of having a choice about the laws is accepted, compatibilists are still committed to the incredible view that free will requires the ability to perform miracles. In this paper, I offer a reply to van Inwagen on Lewis's behalf.

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Author's Profile

Neal Tognazzini
Western Washington University

Citations of this work

Incompatibilism and the garden of forking paths.Andrew Law - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):110-123.

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References found in this work

Are we free to break the laws?David Lewis - 1981 - Theoria 47 (3):113-21.
How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327 - 341.
Freedom to break the laws.Peter van Inwagen - 2004 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 28 (1):334–350.
How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327-341.
An Essay on Free Will.John Martin Fischer - 1988 - Philosophical Review 97 (3):401.

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