Simples and the possibility of discrete space

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):117 – 128 (2006)
Abstract
What are the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an object's being a simple (an object without proper parts)? According to one prominent view, The Pointy View of Simples, an object is a simple if and only if the region occupied by that object contains exactly one point in space. According to another prominent view, MaxCon, an object is a simple if and only if it is maximally continuous. In this paper, I argue that both of these views are inconsistent with the possibility of discrete space. I then go on to formulate analogues to these two views that are consistent with this possibility, and argue that if we are willing to grant the possibility of discrete space, we should endorse the analogue to The Pointy View of Simples over the analogue to MaxCon.
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References found in this work BETA
H. Hudson (2002). The Liberal View of Receptacles. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):432 – 439.
Ned Markosian (1998). Simples. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2):213 – 228.

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