Defeasible Reasoning + Partial Models: A Formal Framework for the Methodology of Research Programs [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Foundations of Science 16 (1):47-65 (2011)
In this paper we show that any reasoning process in which conclusions can be both fallible and corrigible can be formalized in terms of two approaches: (i) syntactically, with the use of defeasible reasoning, according to which reasoning consists in the construction and assessment of arguments for and against a given claim, and (ii) semantically, with the use of partial structures, which allow for the representation of less than conclusive information. We are particularly interested in the formalization of scientific reasoning, along the lines traced by Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programs. We show how current debates in cosmology could be put into this framework, shedding light on a very controversial topic
|Keywords||Partial structures Defeasible reasoning Lakatos Cosmology|
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas S. Kuhn (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Vol. The University of Chicago Press.
Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) (1970). Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Imre Lakatos (1978). The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Cambridge University Press.
Carl Hempel (1965). Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. The Free Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Fernando Tohmé & Ricardo Crespo (2013). Abduction in Economics: A Conceptual Framework and its Model. Synthese 190 (18):4215-4237.
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