Defeasible Reasoning + Partial Models: A Formal Framework for the Methodology of Research Programs [Book Review]

Foundations of Science 16 (1):47-65 (2011)
Abstract
In this paper we show that any reasoning process in which conclusions can be both fallible and corrigible can be formalized in terms of two approaches: (i) syntactically, with the use of defeasible reasoning, according to which reasoning consists in the construction and assessment of arguments for and against a given claim, and (ii) semantically, with the use of partial structures, which allow for the representation of less than conclusive information. We are particularly interested in the formalization of scientific reasoning, along the lines traced by Lakatos’ methodology of scientific research programs. We show how current debates in cosmology could be put into this framework, shedding light on a very controversial topic
Keywords Partial structures  Defeasible reasoning  Lakatos  Cosmology
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References found in this work BETA
Newton C. A. Da Costa & Steven French (1989). Pragmatic Truth and the Logic of Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40 (3):333-356.

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