David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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This work-in-progress expands on Ronald Dworkin's tentative application of his "Right Answer thesis" of legal decisionmaking to the realm of morality. It defends the thesis against the criticisms of Richard Posner, among others, and argues that Dworkin's principle of "best fit" analysis can be applied not only to legal and literary questions but to moral questions as well. It concludes by examining how a "Right Answer thesis" of morality undermines many of the premises of Posner's Wealth Maximization theory of law.
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