David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (1):25-50 (2002)
In everyday discourse and in the context of social scientific research we often attribute intentional states to groups. Contemporary approaches to group intentionality have either dismissed these attributions as metaphorical or provided an analysis of our attributions in terms of the intentional states of individuals in the group.Insection1, the author argues that these approaches are problematic. In sections 2 and 3, the author defends the view that certain groups are literally intentional agents. In section 4, the author argues that there are significant reasons for social scientists and philosophers of social science to acknowledge the adequacy of macro-level explanations that involve the attribution of intentional states to groups. In section 5, the author considers and responds to some criticisms of the thesis she defends.
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Hans Bernhard Schmid (2014). Plural Self-Awareness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.
Thomas Szanto (2014). How to Share a Mind: Reconsidering the Group Mind Thesis. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):99-120.
András Szigeti (2015). Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):843-864.
Kirk Ludwig (2007). Collective Intentional Behavior From the Standpoint of Semantics. Noûs 41 (3):355–393.
Andras Szigeti (2015). Michael E. Bratman: Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (5):1101-1104.
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