David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):50-80 (2012)
Libertarians and classical liberals typically defend private economic liberty as a requirement of self-ownership or on the basis of consequentialist arguments of various sorts. By contrast, this paper defends private economic liberty as a requirement of democratic legitimacy. In recent decades, many philosophers have converged upon a certain view about political justification. If a set of social institutions is to be just and legitimate, those institutions must be acceptable in principle to the citizens who are to lead their lives within them. This deliberative or democratic approach to justification is traditionally associated with thinkers on the left who are skeptical of the importance of private economic liberty. This article shows how the protection of private economic liberty is a requirement of citizens' developing and exercising the moral powers they have as democratic citizens. Democratic legitimacy does not require the affirmation of absolute economic liberty rights as sometimes defended by libertarians. But democratic legitimacy does require that a wide range of private economic liberties be meriting constitutional protection on a par with the civil and political liberties of democratic citizens. This opens the way for a wider defense of classical liberalism based upon the idea of democratic legitimacy
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert Nozick (1974). Anarchy, State and Utopia. Basic Books.
John Rawls (2001). Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Harvard University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Arthur Ripstein (2009). Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
C. S. King (2013). Economic Theories of Democratic Legitimacy and the Normative Role of an Ideal Consensus. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (2):156-178.
Enzo Rossi (2013). Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls' Political Liberalism Versus Gaus' Justificatory Liberalism. Res Publica (1):1-17.
David Plotke (2006). Democratic Polities and Anti-Democratic Politics. Theoria 53 (111):6-44.
Fabienne Peter (2007). Democratic Legitimacy and Proceduralist Social Epistemology. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (3):329-353.
Thomas A. Spragens (2008). Democratic Reasonableness. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2):193-214.
Fabienne Peter (2007). Rawls' Idea of Public Reason and Democratic Legitimacy. Journal of International Political Theory 3 (1):129-143.
Peter Koslowski (ed.) (1987). Individual Liberty and Democratic Decision-Making: The Ethics, Economics, and Politics of Democracy. J.C.B. Mohr.
Milan Zafirovski (2011). “Libertarianism” and the Social Ideal of Liberty: Neo‐Conservatism's “Libertarian” Claims Reconsidered. Social Epistemology 25 (2):183 - 209.
Simon Căbulea May (2009). Religious Democracy and the Liberal Principle of Legitimacy. Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2):136-170.
Arash Abizadeh (2010). Democratic Legitimacy and State Coercion: A Reply to David Miller. Political Theory 38 (1):121-130.
Jon Garthoff (2010). Legitimacy is Not Authority. Law and Philosophy 29 (6):669-694.
Added to index2011-12-15
Total downloads34 ( #95,542 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #147,227 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?