Antirealist Arguments in Behavior Analysis

Behavior and Philosophy 33:55 - 65 (2005)
Abstract Some operant theorists have argued that the most fundamental concepts of behavior analysis have antirealist implications: for example, that stimuli have no physical properties, that we have no epistemic access to a physical world, that the world exists only in behavior, and that we are locked in our behavior. In this article, I show that such beliefs do not derive from behavior analysis. In particular, the concepts of stimulus and response employed in behavior analysis have no antirealist implications. Putative proofs to the contrary are seriously confused.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified (fix it)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,653
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Jay N. Eacker (2001). Selection and the Unification of Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):535-536.
    A. Charles Catania (2003). Why Behavior Should Matter to Linguists. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):670-672.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.

    Added to index

    2011-05-29

    Total downloads

    0

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    0

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums