Behaviorism and Chisholm's Challenge

Behavior and Philosophy 35:139 - 148 (2007)
Foxall's intentional behaviorism is supposed to provide explanation and understanding where radical behaviorism provides only prediction and control. Foxall does identify empirical and conceptual issues with the operant reinforcement framework, but he underestimates the extent of its flaws and partly misidentifies their nature. His intentional behaviorism suffers from conceptual difficulties, and its adherence to a form of instrumentalism may actually make it harder to understand intentional phenomena.
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DOI 10.2307/27759537
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Gordon R. Foxall (2007). Intentional Behaviorism. Behavior and Philosophy 35:1 - 55.
Gordon R. Foxall (1999). The Contextual Stance. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):25-46.
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