Behavior Analysis, Common Sense, and Logic: Reply to Barnes-Holmes
Behavior and Philosophy 33:81 - 84 (2005)
| Abstract | Barnes-Holmes characterizes his views as a-ontological, not antirealist. My criticisms still apply. Barnes-Holmes has not given any good reason to accept antirealism, nor has he given any good reason to accept an a-ontological position. Because his views, a-ontological or otherwise, are contradicted by ubiquitous aspects of the theory and practice of behavior analysis, these views should be rejected until supported by new and better arguments. | |||||||||
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