David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 129 (3):421 - 434 (2006)
It is fairly common, among those who think propositions exist, to think they exist necessarily. Here, I consider three arguments in support of that conclusion. What I hope to show is not that that claim is false, but, rather, that the arguments used in its defense tend to presuppose a certain kind of approach to modality: a roughly Plantingian view. What the arguments show, then, is that one cannot accept that approach to modality and accept contingently existing propositions. But there are other approaches to modality – I discuss three such approaches – into which contingently existing propositions fit perfectly well. This suggests that disputes over, for example, singular propositions, must be conducted within a broader agreement over modal matters if they are to be at all productive.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion|
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