Evolution, naturalism, and the worthwhile: A critique of Richard Joyce's evolutionary debunking of morality
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Metaphilosophy 42 (4):520-546 (2011)
Abstract: In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce argues there is good reason to think that the “moral sense” is a biological adaptation, and that this provides a genealogy of the moral sense that has a debunking effect, driving us to the conclusion that “our moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, … we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.” I argue that Joyce's skeptical conclusion is not warranted. Even if the moral sense is a biological adaptation, developed moralities (such as Aristotelian eudaimonism) can “co-opt” it into new roles so that the moral judgments it makes possible can come to transcend the evolutionary process that is “entirely independent of their truth.” While evolutionary theory can shed much light on our shared human nature, moral theories must still be vindicated, or debunked, by moral arguments.
|Keywords||Richard Joyce eudaimonism evolution of morality naturalism|
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References found in this work BETA
Bernard Arthur Owen Williams (1985). Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press.
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999/2001). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press.
Christine M. Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Brendan Cline (2015). Nativism and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):231-253.
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