A characterization of haecceitism

Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):262-266 (2011)
Anti-haecceitism is the thesis that things cannot differ from actuality in a purely non-qualitatively fashion. Anti-haecceitism being a modal notion, we would expect it to be explicable in terms of possible worlds. Bradford Skow denied that, arguing that alternative conceptions of possible worlds prompt non-equivalent characterizations of anti-haecceitism. Therefore, the haecceitism debate should take place in the modal language, rather than in the language of possible worlds. The aim of this paper is to provide a metaphysically neutral possible-world characterization of anti-haecceitism, i.e. one compatible with alternative understandings of the nature of possible worlds.
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DOI 10.1111/j.2153-960X.2011.00532.x
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References found in this work BETA
Kris McDaniel (2004). Modal Realism with Overlap. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):137 – 152.
Delia Graff Fara (2009). Dear Haecceitism. Erkenntnis 70 (3):285 - 297.

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