David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):177-193 (2011)
This paper concerns the role of the structural properties of representations in determining the nature of their content. I take as a starting point Fodor's (2007) and Heck's (2007) recent arguments making the iconic structure of perceptual representations essential in establishing their content as content of a different (nonconceptual) kind. I argue that the prima facie state?content error this strategy seems to display is nothing but a case of ?state?content error error,? i.e., the mistake of considering that the properties that characterize the type of content certain representations have are indeed independent of their structural properties. I also consider another objection to the general strategy, namely that it falls short of showing that the nonconceptual content of perceptual experiences thus established is the kind of content that figures in true explanations of intentional behavior. I concede this point in respect of Fodor's version of the strategy, while denying that it has any bearing on Heck's approach. The success of this objection in Heck's case ultimately depends, I argue, upon an unjustified commitment to a certain empirically suspect model of perception
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jose Luis Bermudez (2003). Thinking Without Words. Oxford University Press.
Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
Bill Brewer (2005). Perceptual Experience has Conceptual Content. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell.
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
Citations of this work BETA
Víctor M. Verdejo & Daniel Quesada (2011). Levels of Explanation Vindicated. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):77-88.
Similar books and articles
Laura Duhau (2014). Perceptual Nonconceptualism: Disentangling the Debate Between Content and State Nonconceptualism. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):358-370.
Josefa Toribio (2008). State Versus Content: The Unfair Trial of Perceptual Nonconceptualism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 69 (3):351 - 361.
T. M. Crowther (2006). Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism. Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.
Göran Sonesson (2010). From Mimicry to Mime by Way of Mimesis. Sign Systems Studies 38 (1-4):18-65.
Hannah Ginsborg (2008). Was Kant a Nonconceptualist? Philosophical Studies 137 (1):65 - 77.
Daniel Cohnitz (2005). Is Compositionality an a Priori Principle? In M. Wening, E. Machery & G. Schurz (eds.), The Compositionality of Concepts and Meanings: Foundational Issues. Ontos.
Collin Rice (2013). Concept Empiricism, Content, and Compositionality. Philosophical Studies 162 (3):567-583.
Michael Tye (2006). Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 504â30.
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (1996). Two Spurious Varieties of Compositionality. Minds and Machines 6 (2):159-72.
Theo M. V. Janssen (2001). Frege, Contextuality and Compositionality. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 10 (1):115-136.
Bénédicte Veillet (2014). Belief, Re‐Identification and Fineness of Grain. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2):229-248.
Alex Byrne (2005). Perception and Conceptual Content. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 231--250.
Paul Smolensky (1991). Connectionism, Constituency and the Language of Thought. In Barry M. Loewer & Georges Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics. Blackwell.
Added to index2011-04-06
Total downloads22 ( #78,302 of 1,101,579 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #117,010 of 1,101,579 )
How can I increase my downloads?