David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Inquiry 30 (4):451-458 (1987)
It is argued that there are moral costs of our accepting ?strict materialism?, the view that there is no such phenomenon as an irreducible first?person point of view. If we accept strict materialism, then we have to give up some considered moral views, such as the principle of an agent?relative morality and the hedonistic principle. The necessity involved is not logical, however, but pragmatic. Strict materialism does not imply that these moral views are false; it is our belief in them that is undermined by pur belief in strict materialism. If there is no irreducible first?person point of view these moral views simply do not seem to make any moral sense. Since these moral views are prima facie very plausible, the moral costs of our accepting strict materialism are considerable
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1979/2012). Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press.
Thomas Nagel (1986). The View From Nowhere. Oxford University Press.
John Jamieson Carswell Smart & Bernard Williams (1973). Utilitarianism: For and Against. Cambridge University Press.
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