Modularity, Relativism, and Neural Constructivism

Abstract
Fodor claims that the modularity of mind helps undermine relativism in various forms. I shall show first, that the modular vision of mind provides insufficient support for the rejection of relativism, and second, that an alternative model may, in fact, provide a better empirical response to the relativist challenge
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