Time and Simple Existence

Metaphysica 13 (2):125-130 (2012)
Abstract
Sceptics about substantial disputes in ontology often argue that when two philosophers seem to disagree on a quantified claim, they are actually equivocating on the notion of existence that they are using. When temporal elements play a central role, as in the debate between presentists and eternalists, the hypothesis of an equivocation with respect to existence acquires more plausibility. However, the anti-sceptic can still argue that this hypothesis is unjustified
Keywords Existence  Ontological dispute  Presentism  Eternalism
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References found in this work BETA
Ulrich Meyer (2005). The Presentist's Dilemma. Philosophical Studies 122 (3):213 - 225.

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Citations of this work BETA
Giuliano Torrengo (2014). Ostrich Presentism. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):255-276.
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