David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 142 (3):325-344 (2009)
In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truth-conditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist’s objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences.
|Keywords||Tense B-theory Time|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein & David Kaplan (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, USA.
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Donald Davidson (2010). Truth and Meaning. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Synthese. Routledge 304 - 323.
Scott Soames (1999). Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press.
D. H. Mellor (1998). Real Time Ii. Routledge.
Citations of this work BETA
Francesco Orilia & L. Nathan Oaklander (2013). Do We Really Need a New B-Theory of Time? Topoi 34 (1):1-14.
Daniel M. Johnson (2013). B-Theory Old and New: On Ontological Commitment. Synthese 190 (17):3953-3970.
Similar books and articles
Joshua M. Mozersky (2001). Smith on Times and Tokens. Synthese 129 (3):405 - 411.
D. E. Over (1981). Game Theoretical Semantics and Entailment. Studia Logica 40 (1):67 - 74.
Cheng-Chih Tsai (2011). A Unified Tenseless Theory of Time. Prolegomena 10 (1):5-37.
M. García-Carpintero (1998). Indexicals as Token-Reflexives. Mind 107 (427):529 - 563.
Richard Swinburne (1990). Tensed Facts. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (2):117 - 130.
Heather Dyke (2003). Temporal Language and Temporal Reality. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):380–391.
Michelle Beer (2010). Tense and Truth Conditions. Philosophia 38 (2):265-269.
Heather Dyke (2002). Tokens, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions. Synthese 131 (3):329 - 351.
L. A. Paul (1997). Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types. Synthese 111 (1):53-72.
Heather Dyke (2003). Tensed Meaning: A Tenseless Account. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:65-81.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads79 ( #38,410 of 1,725,574 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #81,232 of 1,725,574 )
How can I increase my downloads?