Vagueness and Identity
The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999:161-170 (1999)
| Abstract | The view that identity can be vague is the view that there are statements of identity which are neither true or false. The view that composition can be vague is the view that unities can have borderline-constituents—elements that are neither parts nor non-parts of some larger unity. The case for vague identity is typically made by way of an argument for the vagueness of composition. In what follows, I argue that vague identity does not depend on the vagueness of composition; furthermore, the thesis that composition can be vague is actually incompatible with the thesis of vague identity | |||||||||
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