David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Dialectica 65 (3):345-367 (2011)
In this paper I argue on two fronts. First, I press for the view that judging is a type of mental action, as opposed to those who think that judging is involuntary and hence not an action. Second, I argue that judging is specifically a type of non-voluntary mental action. My account of the non-voluntary nature of the mental act of judging differs, however, from standard non-voluntarist views, according to which ‘non-voluntary’ just means regulated by epistemic reasons. In addition, judging is non-voluntary, I contend, because it is partially constituted by the exercise of a non-reason-governed skill. This skill, which I call ‘critical pop-out’, consists of an unreflective, often unconscious, ability to detect the kind of situations in which the reflective abilities that also partially constitute our acts of judging should be deployed. We are responsible for our judgments, I conclude, because in identifying such reflection-inviting situations, we reveal the kind of epistemic agents we are
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Robert Merrihew Adams (1985). Involuntary Sins. Philosophical Review 94 (1):3-31.
William P. Alston (1988). The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification. Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.
Jonathan Bennett (1990). Why Is Belief Involuntary? Analysis 50 (2):87 - 107.
Quassim Cassam (2010). Judging, Believing and Thinking. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):80-95.
Matthew Chrisman (2008). Ought to Believe. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):346-370.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Conor McHugh (2011). Judging as a Non-Voluntary Action. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.
Christian Stein (1997). Walker on the Voluntariness of Judgment. Inquiry 40 (2):175 – 186.
Keith Hossack (2003). Consciousness in Act and Action. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.
Fabian Dorsch (2009). Judging and the Scope of Mental Agency. In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. 38--71.
Paul Formosa (2009). Thinking, Willing, and Judging. Crossroads 4 (1):53-64.
Sally Sedgwick (2000). Longuenesse on Kant and the Priority of the Capacity to Judge. Inquiry 43 (1):81 – 90.
Lucy F. O'Brien (2005). Self-Knowledge, Agency, and Force. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):580–601.
John Dilworth (2008). Free Action as Two Level Voluntary Control. Philosophical Frontiers 3 (1):29-45.
Jeffrey Hause (2006). Aquinas on Non-Voluntary Acts. International Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):459-475.
Roger Wertheimer (1998). Constraining Condemning. Ethics 108 (3):489-501.
Aaron Stalnaker (2008). Judging Others: History, Ethics, and the Purposes of Comparison. Journal of Religious Ethics 36 (3):425-444.
Christopher Peacocke (2008). Mental Action and Self-Awareness. In Lucy F. O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Action. Oxford University Press.
M. Textor (2010). Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth. Mind 119 (475):615-655.
Added to index2011-07-01
Total downloads50 ( #38,957 of 1,410,057 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #28,515 of 1,410,057 )
How can I increase my downloads?