Partly deductive support in the Popper-Miller argument

Philosophy of Science 56 (3):490-496 (1989)
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Abstract

Popper and Miller (1983) have presented an argument purporting to establish the impossibility of inductive probability. Here I discuss critically their characterization of a deductive part of nondeductive support, a point that has not figured centrally in previous responses.

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10.1086/289504

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In defense of the Popper-Miller argument.Donald Gillies - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):110-113.
On the impossibility of inductive probability.Michael Redhead - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):185-191.
Dualling: A critique of an argument of Popper and Miller.J. Michael Dunn & Geoffrey Hellman - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (2):220-223.

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