The Individuation of Causal Powers by Events (and Consequences of the Approach)
Metaphysica 11 (1):49-61 (2010)
| Abstract | In this paper, I explore the notion of a “causal power”, particularly as it is relevant to a theory of properties whereby properties are individuated by the causal powers they bestow on the objects that instantiate them. I take as my target certain eliminativist positions that argue that certain kinds of properties (or relations) do not exist because they fail to bestow unique causal powers on objects. But the notion of a causal powers is inextricably bound up with our notion of what an event is, and not only is there disagreement as to which theory of events is appropriate, but on the three prevailing theories, it can be shown that the eliminativists arguments do not follow. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Causal powers Events Properties Causal theory of Properties | |||||||||
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Paul Audi (2011). Properties, Powers, and the Subset Account of Realization. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):654-674.
Robert A. Wilson (1992). Individualism, Causal Powers, and Explanation. Philosophical Studies 68 (2):103-39.
Sean Crawford (2003). Relational Properties, Causal Powers and Psychological Laws. Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):193-216.
Jürgen Schröder (2007). Mental Causation and the Supervenience Argument. Erkenntnis 67 (2):221 - 237.
Robert A. Wilson (1993). Against A Priori Arguments for Individualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):60-79.
Toby Handfield (2008). Humean Dispositionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):113-126.
Brian Ellis (2010). Causal Powers and Categorical Properties. In Anna Marmodoro (ed.), The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. Routledge.
Brandon N. Towl (2010). Spurious Causal Kinds: A Problem for the Causal-Power Conception of Kinds. Philosophia 38 (1).
Ann Whittle (2009). Causal Nominalism. In Toby Handfield (ed.), Dispositions and Causes. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press ;.
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