David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):286–314 (2005)
A continuous Oxford tradition on knowledge runs from John Cook Wilson to John McDowell. A central idea is that knowledge is not a species of belief, or that, in McDowell's terms, it is not a hybrid state; that, moreover, it is a kind of taking in of what is there that precludes one's being, for all one can see, wrong. Cook Wilson and McDowell differ on what this means as to the scope of knowledge. J.L. Austin set out the requisite foundations for McDowell to be right. McDowell has shown why the tradition, and his version of it, need to be right. But he does not accept Austin's innovation. That is a shame. For, despite McDowell's very great insightfulness, precisely that much separates him from a very powerful, and correct, view of what knowledge is
|Keywords||occasion-sensitivity knowledge epistemology Austin|
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Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri (2015). Belief Through Thick and Thin. Noûs 49 (4):748-775.
Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). Before the Law. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):219-244.
Marc Champagne (2015). Disjunctivism and the Ethics of Disbelief. Philosophical Papers 44 (2):139-163.
Alan Millar (2011). Why Knowledge Matters. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
Avner Baz (2009). Who Knows? European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.
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