A sense of occasion

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):286–314 (2005)
Abstract
A continuous Oxford tradition on knowledge runs from John Cook Wilson to John McDowell. A central idea is that knowledge is not a species of belief, or that, in McDowell's terms, it is not a hybrid state; that, moreover, it is a kind of taking in of what is there that precludes one's being, for all one can see, wrong. Cook Wilson and McDowell differ on what this means as to the scope of knowledge. J.L. Austin set out the requisite foundations for McDowell to be right. McDowell has shown why the tradition, and his version of it, need to be right. But he does not accept Austin's innovation. That is a shame. For, despite McDowell's very great insightfulness, precisely that much separates him from a very powerful, and correct, view of what knowledge is
Keywords occasion-sensitivity   knowledge   epistemology   Austin
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Citations of this work BETA
Avner Baz (2009). Who Knows? European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.
Mark Eli Kalderon (2011). Before the Law. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):219-244.
Avner Baz (2008). The Reaches of Words. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (1):31 – 56.
Alan Millar (2011). Why Knowledge Matters. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):63-81.
ByAlan Millar (2005). Travis' Sense of Occasion. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):337–342.

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