Truth from a Proof-Theoretic Perspective

Topoi 31 (1):47-57 (2012)
Abstract
Validity, the central concept of the so-called ‘proof-theoretic semantics’ is described as correctly applying to the arguments that denote proofs. In terms of validity, I propose an anti-realist characterization of the notions of truth and correct assertion, at the core of which is the idea that valid arguments may fail to be recognized as such. The proposed account is compared with Dummett’s and Prawitz’s views on the matter
Keywords Proof-theoretic semantics  Truth  Assertion
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