David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):585-606 (2011)
Abstract: Wittgenstein, throughout his career, was deeply Fregean. Frege thought of thought as essentially social, in this sense: whatever I can think is what others could think, deny, debate, investigate. Such, for him, was one central part of judgement's objectivity. Another was that truths are discovered, not invented: what is true is so, whether recognised as such or not. (Later) Wittgenstein developed Frege's idea of thought as social compatibly with that second part. In this he exploits some further Fregean ideas: of a certain generality intrinsic to a thought; of lack of that generality in that which a thought represents as instancing some such generality. (I refer to this below as the ‘conceptual-nonconceptual’ distinction.) Seeing Wittgenstein as thus building on Frege helps clarify (inter alia) his worries, in the Blue Book, and the Investigations, about meaning, intending, and understanding, and the point of the rule following discussion
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
R. H. Stoothoff, Gottlob Frege, Hans Hermes, Friedrich Kambartel & Friedrich Kaulbach (1971). Nachgelassene Schriften. Philosophical Quarterly 21 (82):77.
Charles Travis (2005). Frege, Father of Disjunctivism. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):307-334.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958). The Blue and Brown Books. Harper and Row.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1967). Zettel. Oxford, Blackwell.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Hans-Johann Glock (2006). Thought, Language, and Animals. In Michael Kober (ed.), Deepening Our Understanding of Wittgenstein (Grazer Philosophische Studien, Volume 71, 2006). Rodopi. 139-160.
Charles Travis (2008). To Represent as So. In David K. Levy & Edoardo Zamuner (eds.), Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments. Routledge.
Charles Travis (2006). Thought's Footing: A Theme in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Oxford University Press.
Carlo Penco (2003). Frege: Two Theses, Two Senses. History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):87-109.
Meredith Williams (2009). Blind Obedience: The Structure and Content of Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy. Routledge.
Peter Pagin (2001). Frege on Truth and Judgment. Organon F 8:1-13.
Pascal Engel (2002). The Norms of Thought: Are They Social? Mind and Society 2 (3):129-148.
Fred Dretske (1993). The Nature of Thought. Philosophical Studies 70 (2):185-99.
Charles Travis (2011). Objectivity and the Parochial. Oxford University Press.
Added to index2010-02-19
Total downloads110 ( #9,362 of 1,101,605 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #23,394 of 1,101,605 )
How can I increase my downloads?