David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind 113 (449):57-94 (2004)
There is a view abroad on which perceptual experience has representational content in this sense: in it something is represented to the perceiver as so. On the view, a perceptual experience has a face value at which it may be taken, or which may be rejected. This paper argues that that view is mistaken: there is nothing in perceptual experience which makes it so that in it anything is represented as so. In that sense, the senses are silent, or, in Austin's term, dumb. Perceptual experience is not as such either veridical or delusive. It may mislead, but it does not take representation to accomplish that
|Keywords||Content Experience Metaphysics Perception Representation Harman, G Mcdowell, J|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ayoob Shahmoradi (forthcoming). Why Do We Need Perceptual Content? Philosophical Psychology.
Susanna Schellenberg (forthcoming). Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence Defended. Philosophical Studies:1-18.
Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Experience and Evidence. Mind 122 (487):699-747.
Ned Block (2014). Seeing‐As in the Light of Vision Science. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):560-572.
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