Question authority: in defense of moral naturalism without clout

Philosophical Studies 150 (2):221 - 238 (2010)
Metaethicists of all stripes should read and learn from Richard Joyce's book The Evolution of Morality. This includes moral realists, despite Joyce's own nihilism. Joyce thinks that moral obligations, prohibitions, and the like are myths. But that is just a bit of a rich, broad account of moral attitudes and practices, the bulk of which can comfortably be accepted by realists. In fact, other than nihilism itself, there's only one claim of Joyce's which realists must reject. I argue that that claim ought to be rejected, and reply to Joyce's argument to the contrary. The result is that—aside from nihilism and one rejectable claim—realists are free to take from Joyce whatever they like
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Ethics   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/40856552
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Jon Tresan (2009). The Challenge of Communal Internalism. Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (2):179-199.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

106 ( #28,497 of 1,726,991 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

10 ( #66,646 of 1,726,991 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.