David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12:155-159 (2007)
A straightforward ontological account would be one which acknowledges relations as real beings, and that means, according to the scholastic tradition, as universals. The realist move in this sense which has been re-established within contemporary analytical ontology at least since Russell's early theory, is, however, not the only possible way to take relations seriously. In my paper I shall argue that there is much room for the ontological reconstruction of relations, even if one does not accept universals. The background for this argument is a particularist and realist theory, based on tropes ("trope" being the short name for "property instance" or "individual quality"). One way of reconstruction is that relations themselves are particulars. They are supposed to be relational or polyadic tropes (J. Bacon, D. Mertz). The other way is to hold that relations are internal or formal, and therefore do not require a category sai generis (K. Mulligan, P. Simons). I shall discuss these alternatives and finally opt for the second, i.e., the reconstruction of relations as internal to their relata. Moreover, I offer an argument for why basic relations such as existential dependence should be granted a transcategorial status within trope ontology. Hence, the gist of my paper is to take relations seriously without falling prey either to stubborn nominalism or to strict realism. What I intend to explore is a middle avenue thereby choosing the best of both sides in order to explicate a moderate view on the realism of relations
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski (2005). Internal, External and Intra-Individual Relations. Axiomathes 15 (4):487-512.
Arda Denkel (1997). On the Compresence of Tropes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):599-606.
Peter Simons (2010). Relations and Truthmaking. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):199-213.
Anna-Sofia Maurin (2010). Trope Theory and the Bradley Regress. Synthese 175 (3):311-326.
Joop Leo (2008). Modeling Relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (4):353 - 385.
Christer Svennerlind (2008). Moderate Nominalism and Moderate Realism. Dissertation, Gothenburg University
Thomas Bittner, Maureen Donnelly & Barry Smith (2004). Individuals, Universals, Collections: On the Foundational Relations of Ontology. In Achille Varzi Laure Vieu (ed.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Proceedings of the Third International Conference. IOS Press 37–48.
Thomas M. Ward (2010). Relations Without Forms: Some Consequences of Aquinass Metaphysics of Relations. Vivarium 48 (3-4):279-301.
Barry Smith & Pierre Grenon (2004). The Cornucopia of Formal-Ontological Relations. Dialectica 58 (3):279–296.
Fraser MacBride (2011). Relations and Truthmaking. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):161-179.
Joan Pagès (2002). Structural Universals and Formal Relations. Synthese 131 (2):215 - 221.
Jiri Benovsky (2013). New Reasons to Motivate Trope Theory: Endurantism and Perdurantism. Acta Analytica 28 (2):223-227.
Added to index2011-12-02
Total downloads62 ( #77,054 of 1,939,385 )
Recent downloads (6 months)16 ( #46,452 of 1,939,385 )
How can I increase my downloads?