David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 130 (2):247-71 (2006)
That there is an epistemological difference between the mental and the physical is well- known. Introspection readily generates knowledge of one’s own conscious experience, but fails to yield evidence for the existence of anything physical. Conversely, empirical investigation delivers knowledge of physical properties, but neither finds nor requires us to posit conscious experience. In recent decades, a series of neo-Cartesian arguments have emerged that rest on this epistemological difference and purport to demonstrate that mind-brain identity is false and that consciousness is not even realized by or supervenient on physical properties. Where Descartes argued he could clearly and distinctly conceive mind and body as existing separately, contemporary anti-physicalists hold that the conceivability of worlds in which actual world correlations between physical and phenomenological properties fail shows that these correlations are contingent rather than logically or metaphysically necessary. Together with Descartes, they conclude from conceivability that identity, as well as strong supervenience, is false. 1 If the argument of this paper is correct, however, then there is an argument for dualism that arises from the epistemological distinction, is grounded in the Meditations, and is yet distinct from the " 1 " conceivability arguments pursued both by Descartes and contemporary anti-physicalists. Furthermore, the argument is immune to the standard objections to conceivability arguments: its conclusion follows even if there are a posteriori identities between physical and phenomenal properties
|Keywords||Cogito Dualism Metaphysics Mind Descartes, Rene|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Frank Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. Oxford University Press.
David J. Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.
Saul A. Kripke (1980/1998). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Frank Jackson (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Tim Crane (1999). The Mind-Body Problem. In Rob Wilson & Frank Keil (eds.), The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Sciences. MIT Press
David M. Rosenthal (1998). Dualism. In E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge
Timothy O'Connor (2000). Causality, Mind, and Free Will. Noûs 34 (s14):105-117.
Gordon P. Baker (2002). Decartes' Dualism. Routledge.
Douglas C. Long (1969). Descartes' Argument for Mind-Body Dualism. Philosophical Forum 1 (3):259-273.
James van Cleve (1983). Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (January):35-45.
Robert Francescotti (2001). Property Dualism Without Substance Dualism? Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116.
Rocco J. Gennaro (1996). Mind and Brain: A Dialogue on the Mind-Body Problem. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Tyler Burge (1993). Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
David Woodruff Smith (1993). The Cogito Circa Ad 2000. Inquiry 36 (3):225 – 254.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads90 ( #45,652 of 1,796,563 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #205,823 of 1,796,563 )
How can I increase my downloads?