The Measure of Knowledge

Noûs 47 (3):577-601 (2013)
What is it to know more? By what metric should the quantity of one's knowledge be measured? I start by examining and arguing against a very natural approach to the measure of knowledge, one on which how much is a matter of how many. I then turn to the quasi-spatial notion of counterfactual distance and show how a model that appeals to distance avoids the problems that plague appeals to cardinality. But such a model faces fatal problems of its own. Reflection on what the distance model gets right and where it goes wrong motivates a third approach, which appeals not to cardinality, nor to counterfactual distance, but to similarity. I close the paper by advocating this model and briefly discussing some of its significance for epistemic normativity. In particular, I argue that the 'trivial truths' objection to the view that truth is the goal of inquiry rests on an unstated, but false, assumption about the measure of knowledge, and suggest that a similarity model preserves truth as the aim of belief in an intuitively satisfying way.
Keywords aim of belief  goal of inquiry  trivial truths  similarity  epistemic normativity  significance  aim of inquiry  epistemic good  understanding  knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00854.x
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Paulina Sliwa (2015). IV—Understanding and Knowing. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (1pt1):57-74.

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