David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophia 34 (2):203-208 (2006)
Sydney Shoemaker offers an account of color perception that attempts to do justice, within a functionalist framework, to the commonsense view that colors are properties of ordinary objects, to the existence of qualia, and to the possibility of spectrum inversions. Shoemaker posits phenomenal properties as dispositional properties of colored objects that explain how there can be intersubjective variation in the experience of a particular color. I argue that his account does not in fact allow for the description of a spectrum inversion scenario, and that it cannot sustain a functionalist relationship between an object's color and its phenomenal properties. Functionalists must, however, come to terms with Shoemaker's recognition that intersubjective spectrum shifts are possible.
|Keywords||Color functionalism Color objectivism Sydney Shoemaker|
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1957). Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Cornell University Press.
Sydney Shoemaker (1996). The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Sydney Shoemaker (2003). Content, Character, and Color. Philosophical Issues 13 (1):253-78.
Sydney Shoemaker (2000). Phenomenal Character Revisited. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):465-467.
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