David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Minerva - An Internet Journal of Philosophy 11:54-82 (2007)
The one who dies is deprived of goods that this person would have enjoyed if he or she had continued living, according to the popular “deprivation account of harm.” The person who dies “prematurely” is generally thought to suffer the most harm from death. However, the concept of a premature death is unclear, as will be shown. I will evaluate various conceptions of a premature death and will argue that the existing conceptions are too ambiguous and unreliable to serve as the basis for estimating the degree of harm from death.
|Keywords||Premature Death Badness of Death|
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