Monism and intrinsicality
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):127 – 148 (2009)
| Abstract | Central to the programme of sparse ontology is a hierarchical view of reality; the basic entities form the sparse structure of being, while the derivative entities form the abundant superstructure. Priority pluralism and priority monism are both theses of sparse ontology. Roughly speaking, the priority pluralist claims that wholes and their properties ontologically depend on parts and their properties, while the priority monist claims that it goes the other way around. In this paper I focus on Ted Sider's recent argument that priority monism is probably false because it is incompatible with our best account of intrinsicality. In response I propose an account of intrinsicality that is compatible with both priority monism and priority pluralism. I argue that the account, in addition to having the virtue of being neutral between priority monism and priority pluralism, is independently plausible. | |||||||||
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Matteo Morganti (2009). Ontological Priority, Fundamentality and Monism. Dialectica 63 (3):271-288.
Theodore Sider (2007). Against Monism. Analysis 67 (1):1–7.
Tuomas E. Tahko & Donnchadh O'Conaill (2012). On the Common Sense Argument for Monism. In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza On Monism. Palgrave Macmillan.
Ross P. Cameron (2010). From Humean Truthmaker Theory to Priority Monism. Noûs 44 (1):178-198.
Jonathan Schaffer, Monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Jonathan Schaffer, Monism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Kelly Trogdon (2009). Physicalsim and Sparse Ontology. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165.
Kelly Trogdon (2010). Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):555-558.
Alexander Skiles (2009). Trogdon on Monism and Intrinsicality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):149 – 154.
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