Monism and intrinsicality

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):127 – 148 (2009)
Abstract
Central to the programme of sparse ontology is a hierarchical view of reality; the basic entities form the sparse structure of being, while the derivative entities form the abundant superstructure. Priority pluralism and priority monism are both theses of sparse ontology. Roughly speaking, the priority pluralist claims that wholes and their properties ontologically depend on parts and their properties, while the priority monist claims that it goes the other way around. In this paper I focus on Ted Sider's recent argument that priority monism is probably false because it is incompatible with our best account of intrinsicality. In response I propose an account of intrinsicality that is compatible with both priority monism and priority pluralism. I argue that the account, in addition to having the virtue of being neutral between priority monism and priority pluralism, is independently plausible.
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Kelly Trogdon (2010). Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists). Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):555-558.
    Uriah Kriegel (2012). Kantian Monism. Philosophical Papers 41 (1):23-56.
    Theodore Sider (2008). Monism and Statespace Structure. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 83 (62):129-150.

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