David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 14 (3):261-291 (2001)
This paper advances a novel argument that speech perception is a complex system best understood nonindividualistically and therefore that individualism fails as a general philosophical program for understanding cognition. The argument proceeds in four steps. First, I describe a "replaceability strategy", commonly deployed by individualists, in which one imagines replacing an object with an appropriate surrogate. This strategy conveys the appearance that relata can be substituted without changing the laws that hold within the domain. Second, I advance a "counterfactual test" as an alternative to the replaceability strategy. Third, I show how the typical objects of cross-modal processes (in this case, auditory-visual speech perception), more clearly irreplaceable than the objects of the unimodal process examined by Burge [(1986) Individualism and psychology, The Philosophical Review, XCV, 3-45], supply a firm basis for a nonindividualist interpretation of such cases. Finally, I demonstrate that the routine violation of the individualist's Replaceability Condition occurs even in unimodal cases - so the violation of the replaceability constraint does not derive simply from the diversity of modal sources but rather from the causal complexity of psychological processes generally. The conclusion is that philosophical progress on this issue must await progress in psychology, or, at least, philosophical progress in accounting for psychological complexity--precisely the vicissitude predicted by a thoroughgoing naturalism
|Keywords||Metaphysics Methodology Perception Science Speech|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Casey O'Callaghan (2010). Experiencing Speech. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):305-332.
Similar books and articles
Bob McMurray & David Gow (2005). It's Not How Many Dimensions You Have, It's What You Do with Them: Evidence From Speech Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1):31-31.
Irene Appelbaum (1998). Analytic Isomorphism and Speech Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):748-749.
Casey O'Callaghan (2008). Object Perception: Vision and Audition. Philosophy Compass 3 (4):803-829.
Bruno Galantucci, Carol A. Fowler & M. T. Turvey (2001). Event Coding as Feature Guessing: The Lessons of the Motor Theory of Speech Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):886-887.
Jörgen Pind (1998). Merits of a Gibsonian Approach to Speech Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):279-280.
Jagmeet S. Kanwal (1998). Charting Speech with Bats Without Requiring Maps. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (2):272-273.
Stephen Andrew Butterfill (2009). Seeing Causings and Hearing Gestures. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):405-428.
Howard C. Nusbaum, Jeremy I. Skipper & Steven L. Small (2001). A Sensory-Attentional Account of Speech Perception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):995-996.
Irene Appelbaum (1998). Fodor, Modularity, and Speech Perception. Philosophical Psychology 11 (3):317-330.
Irene Appelbaum (1999). The Dogma of Isomorphism: A Case Study From Speech Perception. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):S250-S259.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #139,072 of 1,679,374 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #183,758 of 1,679,374 )
How can I increase my downloads?